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INTRODUCTION 
 
Most of the emphasis in water resources policy during 
the first seventy years of the twentieth century was on 
development of new supplies. As we approach the 
twenty first century the emphasis has shifted to the 
improved use of existing resources and reduction of 
environmental side effects of water resources.  This 
change in policy emphasis has raised the importance of 
institutions and mechanisms that promote efficient use 
of resources and improved allocation.  Thus, we are 
going through a gradual process of introduction of 
markets and trading for water resource management.  
This transition is occurring globally but varies 
according to the specific environmental and historical 
peculiarities of various locations.   
 
This volume presents papers that provide an overview 
of changes in water resource management strategies in 
various locations.  They mostly take an economic 
perspective to analyze the causes and impacts of 
introducing markets and trading, to investigate some of 
the obstacles for use of economic incentive for water 
resource management, and consider some of the 
limitations of economic tools.   
 
These studies also present a variety of methodological 
approaches.  For example, in Articles 8 and 11 there are 
applications of option theory to resource management 
problems, while in Article 12 an empirical modeling 
approach is presented. The first seven papers present 
problems in the United States (U.S.).  They are followed 
by water problems from Holland, India, France, and 
Israel.  Taken together the papers provide a broad 
overview and integrated perspective on water resource 
issues today. 
 
Traditionally, in many parts of the world there have 
been restrictions on trading through the application of 
water rights regimes; but in Article 2 Brozovic et al. 
show, by using evidence in California, that trading 
occurs even under restriction.  They observed 
establishment of permanent relationships between small 
groups of water users (frequently in pairs) that tend to 
trade mostly among themselves.  This tendency to a 
steady relationship may be explained by the high cost of 
conveyance and the difficulty of water resources 
routing. 
 
In Article 3, Zilberman et al. use another case from 
California to show that extreme conditions, in their case 
drought, trigger modification in water resource 
management.  The drought of 1987-1989 led to the 
adoption of conservation and the introduction of trading 
in California.  In Article 4, Gisser shows that the same 
concept of  “prior appropriation system” that may have 
prevented trading in California was applied in New 
Mexico to enable water trading. He argues that the New 
Mexico system, with strong technical monitoring, led to 
efficient water resource allocation of both surface and 
ground water.   
 
Unlike New Mexico, Texas (like California) has 
restriction of water trading.  The Griffin and Characklis 
report in Article 5 states that Texas has four different 
water doctrines that applies to ground or surface water.  
Initiated by judicial action, but without much legislative 
support, increased scarcity sparked interest in pro-
marketing changes.   They expect to see a more 
centralized control of ground water that will lead to 
efficiency and increase trading within basins.  But this 
process of transition will take time.   
 
Increased scarcity that would lead to trading, market 
and higher prices is likely to trigger changes in the way 
water is applied.  In Article 6, Osgood provides 
evidence in California to show that economic incentives 
play a major role in leading to adoption of weather 
information (supplied through California Irrigation 
Information System).  Regions with high water prices 
and producers of high value crop are the major adopters 
of this technology.  This adoption, in many cases, 
increased likelihood of increased adoption of drip 
irrigation.  Thus, increased scarcity leads to increased 
use of information and in turn that supports water 
conservation technology.   
 
The first 6 articles show the importance of economics in 
the understanding and designing of new institutions of 
water allocation, but there is still a need for water 
projects that will address environmental problems or 
certain risks.  One of the biggest challenges is to 
provide the institutional design for a project that 
addresses transboundary water problems.  In Article 7, 
Frisvold and Osgood demonstrate the severe difficulty 
in solving wastewater collection and treatment on the 
U.S./Mexico border.  They show that new institutions 
that were established to address environmental concerns 
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over the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), helped to finance some of the water 
treatment problems; but they are financed by federal 
agencies, rather than locally, and that this may hamper 
their sustainability.  They suggest that developing 
mechanisms for local finance of water quality 
enhancing facilities is a major research and policy 
challenge. 
 
In Article 8, Zhao suggests that the real option approach 
should be adopted to analyze the design and economics 
of water projects. This approach enables addressing 
problems of irreversibility and uncertainty about 
environmental damage and thus, may improve our 
capacity both to determine timing and magnitude of new 
projects.  He adopted this approach to provide a new 
strategy for the American River Watershed project.     
 
Hellegers and van Ierland in Article 9 provide an 
example from Holland where existing water rights 
systems impair the adoption of modern irrigation 
technologies and increasing ground water use 
efficiency.  The current regime results in low value use 
of ground water and cause desiccation.  They suggest a 
more diversified set of policies that includes ground 
water pricing reform, transferable rights, fine-tuned 
bans, persuasion and subsidies, all of which would lead 
to increased efficiency and improved environmental 
quality.  Ray and Williams in Article 10 suggest 
emphasizing the importance of locational consideration 
in water resource management in their analysis of the 
water system in India.  Upstream farmers have a 
locational advantage and the modeling outcome of 
allocation rule have to take into account possibilities of 
unofficial diversion without effective monitoring.  They 
suggest mechanisms for regional cooperation, which 
would lead to better enforcement of the allocation rule 
and increase efficiency of water systems. 
 
While insufficient control of conveyance is the reason 
for the misallocation of water resources in rural areas, 
the municipal problem may be monopolization.  In 
Article 11 Clark and Mondello develop a framework to 
analyze and regulate a natural monopoly that provides 
surface water.  The optimal pricing that they develop 
takes into account the liability for the irreversible and 
environmental damage that water provision may entail.  
They argue that concern for environmental issues and 
liability laws should lead to modification of existing 
water utility pricing. 
 
Most of the articles in the book emphasize the 
importance of pricing incentives in modifying behavior; 
but in the last article Heiman demonstrates, by using 
empirical studies from Israel, that education and 
increased awareness may also lead to water 
conservation.  He argues that consumers are to a certain 
degree careless in their water use and they could easily 
modify their consumption in response to higher prices 
or a sense of societal urgency.  Therefore, policy makers 
may consider integrating pricing with educational effort 
in addressing water scarcity. 
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